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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study the main factors determining the optimal level of
intellectual property (IP) protection. We are especially interested in how
optimal protection should change as the size of the economy grows. There
is a large literature that explores the qualitative aspects of optimal IP policy,
and a signiﬁcant empirical literature that attempts to measure such things as
the value of patents. There is, however, little connection between the two.
Our goal is to use a relatively standard model of IP and examine the policy
implications of existing quantitative ﬁndings.
To do this we proceed in three steps; ﬁrst, we use the model to derive the
optimal IP policy as a function of measurable parameters and the size of
the market, second, we use available estimates to calibrate those parameters
and quantify the impact of changes in market size, ﬁnally, we put everything
together to obtain the implications for optimal policy.
Conventional wisdom
1 is that optimal policy involves a trade-off between
increasing the monopolistic distortion on inframarginal ideas, and increas-
ing the number of usable ideas by innovating at the margin. To understand
this trade-off requires a general equilibrium model. The best current model
of this type is that of Grossman and Lai [2004], which builds on earlier
work by Grossman and Helpman [1991, 1994, 1995] studying innovation in
a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. To carry out measurement in the Grossman-Lai
framework, we introduce a more detailed model of the production function
for ideas. In our setup, we assume that there are many possible ideas yield-
ing different private returns – deﬁned as the ratio of expected monopoly
revenue to cost of creation in a market of unit size. For a given level of
protection, ideas will be produced if they exceed a cutoff level of private
return. We can think of this cutoff as the marginal idea.
The key policy issue is how many ideas there are of different qualities:
if lowering the cutoff brings many marginal ideas into the market it will be
worth the increased monopoly distortion on infra-marginal ideas, while if it
brings few marginal ideas into the market it will not. In other words, policy
depends on how ideas of different qualities are distributed. In particular,
the aggregate revenue earned by innovators with private returns that are
above the cutoff serves, in our, analysis as a kind of cumulative distribution
function for the quality of ideas. The key policy parameter is the elasticity
of this revenue function with respect to the quality of the marginal idea.
In particular, increasing revenue elasticity with respect to the marginal idea
1We have examined the shortcomings of this conventional wisdom in Boldrin and
Levine [1999, 2002, 2004, 2005a] where we argue that IP is not generally socially
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implies that optimal protection decreases with the scale of the market and
conversely.
Our primary empirical goal is to measure the elasticity of revenue with
respect to the marginal idea. We use two methods of measurement. First,
we attempt to measure the elasticity directly using data we collected on the
distribution of book revenues and existing estimates of the value of patents.
Second, the elasticity of revenue with respect to the marginal idea has im-
plications for the demand for skilled labor. When this elasticity is constant
or decreasing, an increase in market scale will cause the demand for labor
to increase even more rapidly. We examine three sources of data on la-
bor demand: a time series on copyright; a time series on patents and R&D
expenditures; and a cross-section on R&D expenditure across countries.
Each of our empirical efforts has many caveats and each individual nu-
merical calculation must be regarded with a healthy degree of skepticism.
However, despite the fact that each uses very different data, all of our anal-
yses lead to the same conclusion. The heart of our empirical analysis is
contained in four graphs. Two of them report a measure of revenues plotted
against an index of private returns, both in logarithmic units. Increasing
revenue elasticity with respect to the marginal idea means that this curve
should be concave. It is, and it is extremely concave: caveats aside, the data
would have to be remarkably defective if the true underlying curves failed
to be concave. The graphs in the second set plot the growth rate of ideas per
capita against the growth rate of population. Constant or decreasing revenue
elasticity with respect to the marginal idea has the implausible implication
that the growth rate of per capita ideas should be at least as large as – in
practice much larger than – the growth rate of the scale of the economy.
Here the evidence is strong that per capita ideas do not grow faster than
population. We conclude that there is robust evidence that revenue elas-
ticity with respect to the marginal idea is increasing and consequently that
protection should optimally decrease with the scale of the market. As the
scale of the market has been growing over time due to increased population,
income, and trade, this calls into doubt policies of recent decades, such as
those of the WIPO, which have led us in the opposite direction.
2. THE MODEL
GrossmanandLai[2004]provideafullyarticulateddynamicequilibrium
model of the trade-off between increasing the monopolistic distortion on in-
framarginal ideas, and increasing the number of usable ideas by innovating
at the margin. A key result of that paper is that the equilibrium is a steady
state, and a steady state that may be readily analyzed by static methods. For
this reason we do not reproduce their entire model here, but rather focus onMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 3
the static analysis and disaggregate their technology for the production of
ideas from human capital and labor to make it amenable to measurement.
2
Ideas are costly to produce, and yield revenues to their creators. Key to
whether a particular idea will be produced is its return – the ratio of rev-
enue to cost of production. Revenue depends on demand – in our analysis
demand changes with the size of the economy: the bigger the economy, the
more demand for any particular idea. Demand also depends on institutional
arrangements: if the creator has a monopoly over his idea he may earn more
revenue than otherwise.
Our notion of equilibrium is that of a patent equilibrium in which there
is a ﬁxed common length of patent protection for all ideas. This means that,
in terms of present value of the ﬂow of consumption, a fraction 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
occurs under monopoly, and a fraction (1−φ) occurs under competition;
hence φ is the level or the extent of protection. While the patent lasts, the
innovator is a monopolist. Once a patent expires, anyone who wishes to
do so may freely make copies, and price falls to marginal cost with the
innovator earning no further revenue.3 An idea is produced if, given the
patent length φ, the prospective monopolist ﬁnds it proﬁtable to pay the
cost of innovation.
The cost of innovation depends on the price of inputs used to produce the
idea – in practice the relevant input is specialized labor, the cost of which is
determined by the wage rate w. Suppose the size of the economy is ﬁxed at
one, that the wage rate w = 1 and that the creator has a complete monopoly
over his creation, so that φ =1. Under these conditions, we denote by ρ the
private return on the creation – the ratio of present value revenue to cost. If
in fact the size of the economy is λ, the wage rate is w and the creator can
appropriate only a fraction φ of the monopoly revenue, then the return on
the creation is λφρ/w. Naturally, the creator will choose to create if and
only if λφρ/w ≥ 1, that is ρ ≥ w/λφ.
Ideasvaryintheirprivatereturnρ. Someverygoodideasarevaluablebut
cost little to produce and so have high values of ρ; others will cost a great
deal and not yield much revenue, so ρ will be low. As we have observed,
the ideas that will be produced are those for which the private return ρ is at
least w/λφ. What matters from an economy wide perspective, then, is the
distribution of private returns. It is convenient to think of this in terms of the
amount of labor needed to create ideas. In particular, we denote by h(ρ) the
total amount of labor input required to produce all ideas that have private
2Details of how to embed the model here and theirs can be found in the longer working
paper Boldrin and Levine [2005b].
3We assume there are no competitive rents after the patent expires; as pointed out in
Boldrin and Levine [1999], inventors generally do earn positive competitive rents.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 4
return ρ in an economy of unit size (λ = 1). The function h(ρ) is similar to
a probability density function, except that, since it is measured in units of
labor, it need not integrate to one. For example, it is useful to compute the
total amount of labor needed to produce all ideas in an economy of unit size
with private returns at least equal to ρ. This is simply H(ρ) =
R ∞
ρ h(ρ0)dρ0,
which is similar to a cumulative distribution function, except in reverse.
Notice however, that as ρ → 0 it may be that H(ρ) → ∞, that is, we do not
assume it is necessarily feasible to produce all possible ideas.
The function H(ρ) is then a measure of total labor input, while aggre-
gate output can be measured by the (total monopoly) revenue M(ρ) = R ∞
ρ ρ0h(ρ0)dρ0. In other words, M(ρ) is the sum of monopoly revenue over
all ideas with private value of ρ, or greater, in an economy of unit size. We
assume that M is differentiable and deﬁne the elasticity of revenue with re-
spect to the marginal idea4 as ϒ(ρ)≡−ρDM(ρ)/M(ρ)>0. We also make
the regularity assumption that ϒ(ρ) is differentiable.
We need also to consider what happens to the number of ideas that are
produced as the economy is scaled up. That is, in the unit economy, pro-
ducing all ideas with private return ρ requires h(ρ) units of labor. If an
economy of size λ has λ times as many ideas with private return ρ as an
economy of unit size, then this economy would require λh(ρ) units of labor
as input. More generally, we assume that an economy of size λ has g(λ)
times as many ideas with private return ρ as an economy of unit size. To
capture the principle that in a larger population more ideas of a given pri-
vate return are available g(λ) is assumed non-decreasing; without loss of
generality we take g(1) = 1.
Our primary interest is in social welfare. To analyze welfare, we need to
consider more closely the private and social beneﬁt from an idea. A new
idea makes it possible to produce new goods and services. Suppose that
Q is the quantity of goods and services produced using a given idea, and
that these goods and services are produced at constant marginal cost c. For
example, the idea may be a new novel, and Q the number of copies that are
produced; or the idea may be the design of an electronic component, and Q
are the number of components produced. Suppose individual (per capita)
demand at price p is given by q(p). Notice the assumption that individual
demand does not depend on the scale of the economy.5 Then Q = λq(p),
and we may invert this function to obtain the marginal willingness to pay
function p = P(Q/λ).
4In Boldrin and Levine [2005b] we show that this is identical to the elasticity of research
output with respect to labor in the Grossman and Lai [2004] formulation.
5This might not be the case if there were network effects in using the output.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 5
The monopolist maximizes [P(Q/λ)−c]Q. Denote the solution pM for
the monopoly price and QM for the monopoly quantity. The private ben-
eﬁt of the innovation to the monopolist is (pM −c)QM. The social value
of the innovation depends on whether or not there is competition. Under
competition output is determined by P(QC/λ) = c. Notice that QM,QC are
independent of the scale of the market. If Qi ∈ {QM,QC} social value is
R Qi
0 (p(Q0/λ)−c)dQ0 = λ
R Qi/λ
0 (p(q)−c)dq. Notice that the ratio of so-
cial to private beneﬁts (QM/λ)(pM −c)/
R Qi/λ
0 (p(q)−c)dq depends only
on per capital consumption of the idea under competition and monopoly.
These are independent of the scale of market λ.
It is instructive to consider the case of linear demand, so that p(q) =
a−bq. Normalizing the cost of the invention to one, the return to monop-
oly is λρ = λ(a−c)2/2b, the social value of the idea in the absence of
monopoly is 2ρ and in the presence of monopoly it is 3ρ/2. The key fact is
that with linear demand the ratio of social to private return is independent
of the private return. We will take this as our basic hypothesis. That is,
under monopoly, we assume that the social return is νMρ, while once the
monopoly expires, the social return is νCρ, where νC > νM > 1.6 With this
assumption of proportionality, the per capita social welfare corresponding
to a particular level of protection φ, when all ideas with private return of ρ
and greater are produced, is:
W(ρ,φ) = g(λ)
Z ∞
ρ
[λφνMρ0+(1−φ)λνCρ0−1]h(ρ0)dρ0
3. OPTIMAL IP PROTECTION
We ﬁrst ask how socially optimal protection ˆ φ depends on market size λ.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the opportunity cost of skilled labor is con-
stant at w = 1. When ˆ φ(λ) < 1, in a neighborhood of ρ = 1/λ ˆ φ(λ), the
following holds. (I) Dϒ(ρ) > 0 implies ˆ φ(λ) is unique and strictly de-
creasing; (II) Dϒ(ρ) = 0 implies ˆ φ(λ) is unique and constant; and (III)
Dϒ(ρ) < 0 and ˆ φ(λ) unique7 implies ˆ φ(λ) is strictly increasing.
6To the extent that the ratio of social to private return increases with private return
our results about market scale are reinforced: there is little reason to encourage ideas of
marginal private value as their social value is so low. To the extent that the ratio of social to
private return decreases with private return, intellectual property is not terribly appealing as
a system for encouraging new ideas: in the extreme case where the correlation is negative,
it results in the ideas with lowest social value being produced at the expense of those with
the highest social value.
7In this case we cannot guarantee that the second order condition is satisﬁed, so we
must rule out the possibility that ˆ φ(λ) has multiple values.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 6
The details of the proof are in Appendix 1.
Next we examine the implications of increasing the scale of the market
on the demand for skilled labor. Continuing to hold the wage rate ﬁxed at
w = 1, labor demand is given by
LD(λ) = g(λ)H(1/φλ),
from which, letting E denote the elasticity operator, we have
E[LD(λ)] = E[g(λ)]−E[H(ρ)].
Depending on which assumptions one makes about g(λ), the ﬁrst factor
ranges from zero to any large positive number. For example, in the Gross-
man and Lai [2004] setting, g(λ) can be identiﬁed with aggregate human
capital. To the extent this is constant, E[g(λ)]=0. In models of growth and
innovation due to externalities or increasing returns, such as Grossman and
Helpman [1991, 1994, 1995] or Romer [1990], g(λ) is assumed to increase
faster than λ, hence E[g(λ)] > 1. A benchmark case is that in which each
individual draws her own ideas from the same urn, either with or without
replacement. If sampling is without replacement, and each person draws
the same number of ideas, then g(λ) = λ and E[g(λ)] = 1; if sampling is
with replacement then E[g(λ)] ≤ 1.
As for the second factor, notice ﬁrst that the demand for labor is linked
to the total revenue function by the following relation
H(ρ) =
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0.
Now, assume that M(ρ) = ρ−ζ, which is the constant elasticity case. Then
H(ρ) =
ζρ−1−ζ
ζ +1
and
E[LD(λ)] = E[g(λ)]+ζ +1.
Notice that when E[g(λ)] > 1−ζ, the elasticity of labor demand is pre-
dicted to be larger than two, hence the elasticity of per capita labor de-
mand is greater than one. More generally, since E[g(λ)] ≥ 0, we have
E[LD(λ)/λ] > 0. In other words, in the constant elasticity case as the size
of the economy grows, the share of workers in the idea sector grows as well.
The next proposition, proven in Appendix 1, shows how this ﬁnding can be
extended from the case of constant elasticity to decreasing elasticity of the
total monopoly revenue.
Proposition3.2. ConsidertworevenuefunctionsM1,M2 thathavethesame
value M1(ρ) = M2(ρ) and derivative DM1(ρ) = DM2(ρ) (hence, ϒ1(ρ) =
ϒ2(ρ)) at ρ. If Dϒ1(ρ0) < Dϒ2(ρ0) for ρ0 ≥ ρ, thenMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 7
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated
to M2; that is,
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM1(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0 <
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM2(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0.
(2) The elasticity of labor demand from M1 is greater than the elasticity
of labor demand from M2, that is E[H1(ρ)] > E[H2(ρ)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand func-
tions increases monotonically.
In plain words: a revenue function with decreasing elasticity implies an
elasticity of labor demand even larger than that of a constant elasticity rev-
enue function, which we have shown to be at least one in practice. Playing
this backward: should the empirical elasticity of per capita labor demand
with respect to market size be smaller than one, then the associated total
revenue function must display increasing elasticity. Per capita labor in the
idea sector growing faster than the scale of market is consistent with in-
creasing elasticity of total monopoly revenue, because E[g(λ)] can be large,
which is independent of the elasticity of monopoly revenue. However, if per
capita labor grows more slowly than the size of the market, we must rule
out both constant and decreasing elasticity.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TOTAL MONOPOLY REVENUE
Upuntilnowwehavebeenthinkingofideasasemptyboxestobeﬁlledin
by individuals. From an empirical perspective, it is more useful to think of
eachindividualbeingassociatedwithhisownideasandhisownopportunity
costs of engaging in innovative activity. We then identify individuals with
their private returns ρ and think of them as equivalent to the expected value
of their ideas, with the latter being drawn from an underlying distribution
µ(ρ) satisfying the technical restrictions discussed earlier for h(ρ). We
are interested in the shape of µ(ρ) as this would allow us to compute the
elasticity of M(ρ) at the “cutoff idea-individual.”
An issue arises at this point. We are interested in the ex ante distribution
of the expected return on an idea. In the data, we observe ex post a proxy for
revenue such as patent value or book revenue, and we do not observe either
the opportunity cost of each inventor or the labor cost of his ideas. These are
important limitations. We address them in two ways: ﬁrst we look for data
in which there is little ex ante uncertainty about returns, and second we look
for data in which the cost of producing ideas is similar for different ideas.
In examining patent data, there is little we can do about the problem of ex
ante versus ex post returns, but we attempt to restrict attention to ideas withMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 8
comparable production cost by examining data from narrow sectors which
produce goods that are relatively homogeneous. On the copyright front,
we examine data from trade ﬁction for two reasons: ﬁrst, the opportunity
cost of producing a novel is reasonably homogeneous across individuals,
and second, after the ﬁrst novel, the earnings from subsequent novels is
relatively predictable based on past sales.
We ﬁrst examine the data assuming that we can measure ρ without error
and that the cost of each invention is the same. Because this is certainly not
true, at the end of the section we examine the consequences for measure-
ment of both return uncertainty and cost that is correlated with return. We
show that the consequent biases are not likely to be severe.
A second issue concerns aggregation. The same φ applies across many
industries. Aggregating across industries, we see that M(ρ) = ∑iMi(ρ),
where i indexes industries. Unfortunately, the fact that each Mi(ρ) function
has increasing elasticity does not imply that this is true for M(ρ). However,
if −ρDMi(ρ) is increasing, then the corresponding elasticity is increasing
as well, and this condition does aggregate. For this reason we examine not
only whether the elasticities are increasing, but also whether −ρDMi(ρ) is
increasing.
Patent Values. There is a substantial literature analyzing the value of a
patent - what we refer to as the private return. If we aggregate across in-
dustries, some industries such as pharmaceuticals have patents that have
much higher private returns and much higher private costs. By examining
estimates that are disaggregated by industry, we hope that the ﬁxed cost of
the innovation is not so systematically related to the realized revenues. The
most suitable data we have been able to identify is the value of patent data
from Lanjouw [1993] for four German industries. These estimates are con-
structed on the basis of patent renewal rates and data on the cost of patent
renewal.
From Lanjouw’s data, we graph the corresponding M(ρ) curves in log-
arithms in Figure 1. Notice that the tails are not at all similar to that of
a Pareto distribution – the curves fall far too close to zero. Numerical es-
timates can be found in Figure 2. This reports for each industry and for
increasing values of ρ, the elasticities evaluated at the midpoint of each
segment of the linear spline. The number in square brackets is the corre-
sponding value of −ρDMi(ρ).
With the exception of the highest category of ρ for computers, elastici-
ties are increasing everywhere. While not always increasing, −ρDMi(ρ) is
increasing in the relevant range, that is, at lower values of ρ, for all i.
Our ﬁndings for patents appear to accord well with the existing empir-
ical literature. To name but a few recent studies, Harhoff, Scherer, andMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 9
FIGURE 1. _
FIGURE 2. Elasticities
Computers Pharmaceuticals Textiles Engines
.22 [.17] .14 [.12] .19 [.15] .32 [.23]
.74 [.40] .53 [.33] .66 [.38] .95 [.45]
.93 [.30] .75 [.30] .88 [.31] 1.12 [.32]
3.76 [.60] 2.35 [.48] 2.42 [.44] 3.04 [.42]
2.73 [.12] 2.81 [.16] 3.02 [.14] 3.37 [.12]
Vopel (1997) use a data set of full-term patents applied for in 1977 and held
by West German and U.S. residents. They compare the ability of various
empirical distributions, including the Pareto, to ﬁt the data and ﬁnd that a
two-parameter lognormal distribution provides the best ﬁt. Silverberg and
Verspagen (2004) use a variety of different data sources from both Europe
and the U.S.A. and two different measures of ρ (citations and monetary val-
ues). They ﬁnd that, while the overall distributions are well approximated
by exponential ones, it is the upper tail that is better captured by a Pareto
distribution. As our concern here is with the shape of the µ(ρ) near theMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 10
FIGURE 3. _
lower cutoff value, this is supportive of our claim. The econometric lit-
erature on the value of patents, stemming from the paper of Pakes [1986]
(see Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg [2004] for a recent update and new re-
sults), seems to almost unanimously ﬁnd that the appropriate distribution is
a log-normal or an exponential, for both of which the elasticity of the total
revenue function is increasing.
Revenue from Authorship of Fiction Books. We now examine a particu-
lar category of creative individuals: authors of ﬁction books. Although we
do not have data on lifetime income of individual authors, we do have data
on the revenue generated by individual book sales. While it is costly to print
and distribute books once they are written, authors are traditionally paid a
percentage of gross revenue, so that revenue is an accurate measure of the
private return to the author.
We gathered data on revenues for ﬁction books published in March and
September of 2003 and 2004, respectively; our samples range between
1,200 and 1,300 books for each of these four months. The details of the
data collection procedure can be found in Appendix 2. The sales data are
from a single distributor, Ingram, constituting roughly one-sixth of the book
market, so total revenues are about six times the numbers reported. Figure
3 shows M(ρ) computed on the basis of the September 2003 data in loga-
rithmic units, including a close up of the lower revenue section of the plot.
The data for the other months, not reported but available, yield extremely
similar results.
There are two key issues in analyzing this data. First, as is evident in
graph, thedatahaveadiscontinuitybetweenroughly$150,000and$300,000MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 11
in revenue.8 Needless to say, the $150,000 and $300,000 books are pre-
dominately by “big name” authors, who are largely irrelevant for optimal
copyright policy: the relevant part of the M(ρ) function is for marginal, not
inframarginal, books. Second, many books earn surprisingly little revenue.
In September 2003, 1,181 books, out of a total of 1,223, earned $50,000
or less through Ingram – corresponding to total revenue of approximately
$300,000. These books accounted for 50% of total revenue, that is, $6M
out of $12M. The numbers for the other months are similar. In the same
data, 984 books earned less than $10,000 through Ingram – corresponding
to total revenue of $60,000 or less. It should not be thought that such a book
is a “commercial failure” – the ﬁxed cost in printing were already quite low
by 2003, and publishers are often happy to make a proﬁt by selling, for ex-
ample, a small run of a thousand or less monographs on economic theory to
libraries. Nor is it necessarily a failure for an author who may earn 15% of
the $60,000, or around $9,000 for what may be as little as a month of effort.
However, as we get closer to the lower end of the data, it is clear that many
books are published that are not commercial successes. Examining speciﬁc
titles convinces us that these are largely vanity press items. This does raise
the question of whether a model of proﬁt maximizing authors is the correct
model with which to understand ﬁction books. It is true that if the author
pays to have the book published, he receives no beneﬁt from copyright.
However, if the publisher pays the author, even if the author receives some
additional psychological beneﬁt from seeing his work in print, the model
applies. Hence, while works below the cutoff of commercial viability are
published the model applies to those above the cutoff.
In analyzing the speciﬁc details of the elasticity we face the problem of
knowing where exactly the cutoff for commercial viability is. However, the
results are not terribly sensitive to this detail. Except near the irrelevant
upper tail, the function clearly exhibits increasing elasticity. The actual
elasticity ϒ ranges from zero when ρ = 0 to ϒ = 0.1 when ρ = 5000 –
which is a plausible value for books that are not mere vanity press items –
to about ϒ = 0.3 for the higher values of ρ, so the value of ϒ is quite low
regardless of where the cutoff is.
Robustness and Measurement Error. As we noted above, there are prob-
lems with measurement of both ex ante private return and with the assump-
tion that the opportunity cost of invention is independent of the return. To
8This is broadly consistent with other data on books revenues: Leibowitz and Margolis
[2003] report that less than 200 out of 25,000 titles account for roughly two-thirds of all
book revenues. That is more concentrated than we ﬁnd in our data but also reﬂects a strong
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analyze the matter, let us distinguish between r the observed proxy return,
and ρ the actual ex ante expected return.
Let us take up the issue of ex ante uncertainty ﬁrst. Particularly in the
patent data, much of the observed private return may not have been know ex
ante when the cost of developing the idea was incurred. What consequence
does this have for our estimates? First consider the simple case where the
only uncertainty is the possibility of failure. Then the ex post return can
take on two values, 0 with probability πF and r with probability 1−πF. In
other words, ρ = (1−πF)r and this has no consequence for either the level
or derivative of the elasticity. This model is especially relevant for pharma-
ceutical, where the market for the new product is relatively predictable, but
there is a high probability it may be a failure in clinical trials.
Second, suppose that the realized return is r = θρ, where θ is a posi-
tive random variable independent of ρ and having mean equal to one. In
this case the observed revenue function is a convolution of the underlying
revenue function we are trying to measure. This raises an issue similar to
that of aggregating across different industries. In particular, elasticities do
not aggregate, so we cannot conclude, for example, that if the elasticity is
declining with the marginal idea, then this will remain true when we take
the convolution. However, as we observed, −ρDMi(ρ) does aggregate. So
if elasticity declines with the marginal idea, then −ρDMi(ρ) must decline
even more rapidly, and therefore for the observed revenue function Mr(r)
the corresponding derivative −rDMr(r) must also decline. As we indicated,
in the patent data, this is not the case.
Next, consider the consequences of opportunity cost that increases with
observed return. This means that observed returns will be overstated for
high returns, and understated for low returns. A simple model is
ρ = a+br.
In this case, ρ0 > ρ if and only if r0 >
ρ−a
b . It follows that
M(ρ) = Mr

ρ −a
b

.
−
ρDM
M
= −
1
b
ρDMr
Mr = −
ρ
ρ −a
rDMr
Mr .
This implies that the actual elasticity is bigger than the observed elasticity
and that the actual elasticity increases less than the observed elasticity. In
particular, to the extent that costs are considerably higher for high value
patents, our results are biased towards intellectual protection terms that are
too short and decline too rapidly with the size of the market. It is worth
noting, however, that the effect is not generally quantitatively great: in par-
ticular, if the observed revenue is linear, then the actual revenue will alsoMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 13
exhibit elasticity that increases with respect to the marginal idea. Moreover,
in the important case of pharmaceuticals, a crucial component of the cost
is the clinical trials - the cost of which does not depend on the value of the
idea.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LABOR DEMAND
As we have seen, there is a close connection between the elasticity of
total monopoly revenue and labor demanded by the ideas sector. Here we
exploit this relationship to get a second source of information about whether
the elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing or decreasing.
Patent Time Series. We turn to the demand for labor used to produce
patentable ideas. One issue that arises is whether we should measure the
scale of market λ by population or by GDP. Increases in per capita GDP
increase the scale of the market, but they increase the opportunity cost of
labor in the non-idea sector (working with existing ideas) by the same pro-
portion, so increases in GDP have an ambiguous impact on the effective
scale of the market. On the other hand, increased productivity in the non-
idea sector may also be reﬂected in increased productivity in the idea sector:
double the per capita income may mean twice as many ideas per capita, or
half the labor time required before to implement a new idea. For these rea-
sons we will focus on population as a more conservative measure of λ in
time series data, where per capita GDP is increasing. In the cross section
we will examine both population and GDP as measures of scale of market.
Figure4reportsannualgrowthofpopulationagainstthepercapitagrowth
in patents awarded and patent applications. If elasticity of revenue with
respect to the marginal idea is constant or decreasing, we expect to see
per capita invention growing more rapidly than population. In fact, for per
capita invention to grow at only the rate of growth of the scale of the econ-
omy, it must be that E[g(λ)] = 0, meaning that the number of available
ideas does not increase at all as the size of the economy expands. This is
not especially plausible, so if the elasticity of revenue with respect to the
marginal idea is constant or decreasing, we would expect the growth rate
of inventions to be much greater than the growth rate of the scale of the
economy. As can be seen in Figure 4 this is far from the case. Whether
we measure patentable activity by patents awarded or by patent applica-
tions, from 1890 to 1980 the growth rate of per capita patents exceeds the
growth rate of population in only two decades, 1900-1910 and 1960-1970,
and in both cases by only a trivial amount. In other decades, the growth rate
of patents per capita is much lower than population growth, in some cases
even negative. Overall, from 1890 to 1980 population grew at a rate of
1.4% per year and per capita patents at 0.1% per year. Before 1890 patentsMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 14
FIGURE 4. _
per capita grew considerably faster than population, with a large drop in
patents from 1860 to 1870 most likely because the reform of the patent law
and patent ofﬁce in 1861 made it considerably more difﬁcult to get a patent.
In the opposite direction, in the period after 1980 it became continually eas-
ier to get and enforce a patent: during these decades software and business
practices became patentable for the ﬁrst time, and the standard of “obvious-
ness” of a patent declined markedly. Some landmark events in this period
being the creation, in 1982, of a special federal court to try patent cases and
the State Street Decision in 1998 establishing the patentability of business
practices. We should note also that this surge in patenting did not result in
a surge in the growth of TFP as it should if these patents represent an eco-
nomically meaningful increase in inventive activity. In summary, the time
series of patents lead us to the same conclusions we reached with copyright:
that patents have grown less than market size, thereby suggesting that the
elasticity of monopoly revenue is increasing also in this case.
An alternative to measuring either patent applications or awards is to use
R&D expenditure as a proxy for the amount of labor used in creating new
ideas. R&D expenditure, while in principle a better measure of input than
patents, has a number of its own problems. First, the concept of R&D
expenditure is fairly fuzzy and available only for relatively recent years –
the major source of data being an NSF survey conducted since 1953. The
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basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of
man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise
new applications.” Firms and government agencies are surveyed and asked
to report how much they spend on this activity.
The picture of R&D expenditure as measured by the NSF is ambiguous
and yet different from that of the number of patents – ambiguous because
the choice of which measure of R&D expenditure one should consider is
not obvious. One possibility is to focus on the private sector only. How-
ever, we would expect that research ﬁnanced by the federal government –
much of which is carried out at private institutions – both produces useful
ideas and increases the demand for skilled labor. On the other hand, there
are reasons to believe that the federal expenditure in R&D reacts much less,
or maybe not at all, to market incentives and to the expected proﬁtability
of innovations in particular.9 Universities, either public or private, are ob-
viously producing ideas and employing skilled workers, but the extent to
which they respond to market incentives may have varied substantially dur-
ing the last ﬁfty years. In the light of this, we will report statistics for four
aggregates: total, private sector plus universities, and these same two series
adjusted for the wage rate of college and post-college workers. The latter
are relevant because the wage skill premium increased dramatically during
the last thirty years, and workers involved in R&D activities hold college,
and most often post-college, degrees.
The ratio of total R&D expenditure to GDP has grown from 1.36% in
1953 to 2.78% in 2002, thereby doubling in ﬁfty years. During the same
time, population has grown about 80% and real GDP has almost quintu-
pled. It may be worth noticing that the maximum value for the total R&D
expenditure to GDP ratio, 2.88%, was reached in 1964. For the private plus
universities aggregate, the same ratio has more than tripled between 1953
and 2002, going from 0.63% to 2.0%. Next, assume that the cost of labor
employed in the idea sector grows, roughly, at one-half the college wage
and one-half the post-college wage.10 Then the cost of the average worker
in the idea sector between 1963 and 2002, the period for which data are
available, has grown by about 95%, while over the same period, the mean
wage has grown by about 65%.11 Between 1963 and 2002, the ratio of
9This point is made by Jones [2004] while analyzing the R&D data and the “patent
puzzle.” However, we would expect some scale of market effect on federal R&D expen-
diture as well – as the scale of the market increases so does the tax base that pays for the
expenditures.
10This is arbitrary but not unreasonable.
11High school graduate wages grew 20%, college graduate wages grew by 65%, and
post-college graduate wages grew at 123%; see Eckstein and Nagypal [2004], Figures 1
and 3.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 16
total R&D expenditure to GDP basically does not move, while the indus-
try plus universities ratio goes from 0.9% to 2.0%. That is, the industry
plus university ratio grows by 110%, population grows by 52%, and total
GDP by 70%. Because our index of the relative wages in the idea sector
has grown roughly 20% over the same period, it turns out that, if one uses
total expenditure in R&D, then the share of workers in the idea sector has
actually declined, implying a strongly increasing elasticity of M(ρ); if, in-
stead, one uses the private plus universities measure, it has grown by about
90%. The latter is somewhat higher than either the population or the GDP
growth rates; hence, on the basis of the last index, one cannot rule out the
hypothesis that the elasticity of the total revenue function is either constant
or decreasing.12 On the other hand, while we cannot rule out this case com-
pletely, the combination of assumptions – including the assumption that the
number of ideas do not grow as more people are added to the economy –
needed to get this result are extremely implausible.
R&D Cross Section. Finally, we look at a cross section of countries. Here
we run a simple cross-country regression with R&D as a fraction of GDP
as the dependent variable and market size and the strength of IP protection
as explanatory variables.13 We initially assume that the domestic market is
what is signiﬁcant.
Let ` represents per capita labor effort in the ideas sector, recall that λ is
the size of the market and the fraction of the market on which proﬁts can
be earned is φ. So from the private sector point of view, φλ is the relevant
size of the market. If we assume constant elasticity of labor demand with
respect to relevant market size, we can write log` = A+ϑ log(φλ), where
ϑ is the elasticity and A is an uninteresting intercept term. Naturally both
population N and per capita GDP y have an impact on market size, so we
take λ = yαN. Our OLS equation is then log` = A+ϑ logφN+αϑ logy.
Our sample consists of 35 countries every ﬁve years from 1980 to 1995.14
Data on per capital GDP (y), population (N), and R&D per GNI (`) is from
the World Bank. The Park index of patent protection (φ) ranges in value
12An endless list of additional caveats should be added. The tax and accounting treat-
ments of R&D have changed substantially over the period, favoring the relabeling of many
sources of cost as R&D expenditure. The Cold War, and the changing federal policies
toward basic research also add additional uncertainty to the interpretation of the data.
13To measure the latter we use an index developed by Walter Park, to whom we are
grateful for providing us with his data. Details of the construction can be found in Park
and Lippholdt [2003].
14Some data is missing so there are 122 observations. The data and a detailed explana-
tion is available from http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 17
from 0.33 in Indonesia prior to 1995 to a high of 4.86 in the U.S. in 1995.15
The result of simple OLS regression (standard errors in parentheses, R2 =
0.65) is ϑ = 0.19(0.03) and αϑ = .56(0.038). Implicitly α = 2.8.
The estimated elasticity of R&D with respect to λ is clearly not close ei-
ther economically or statistically to unity. The estimate α =2.8 is a remark-
ably large number. It implies that as per capita income increased, market
size expanded much more rapidly. Since, as in our earlier time series, R&D
per capita increased very little during a period in which per capita income
skyrocketed we are forced to the low value of ϑ = 0.19.
One question that arises is whether this is an artifact of the assumption
that the relevant market for R&D is the domestic market. First, we observe
that the evidence suggests that the domestic market is the more important
measure of market scale. Except for a few small rich countries such as
Switzerland and Luxembourg16 exports are almost everywhere a fraction
of GDP. It is true that export intensive industries are generally more R&D
intensive than domestic industries - in Taiwan, using Lo’s [2003] detailed
data, in 1991 export intensive industries spent about 1.8 times as much on
R&D as domestic-oriented industries. This does still not suggest a large ef-
fect of the sales of ideas abroad on market size. Using microdata on renewal
rates to estimate the value of patents Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam [1998]
ﬁnd the highest value of the “implicit subsidy from patenting abroad” at
35% for the U.K. and Germany, with most countries receiving 15-20% of
the income from a patent from rights held abroad.
Another angle of attack on the issue of the role of the world market is
to observe that the scale of the world market is growing at essentially the
same rate for all countries in any given year, so the omitted variable of
world demand should be highly correlated with a time trend. However
adding a time trend has virtually no effect on the estimation. The coefﬁ-
cient estimates and standard errors are virtually unchanged ϑ = 0.19(0.03)
and αϑ = .55(0.041) while the annual effect of growth in world GDP on
R&D per capita is estimated to be only 0.3%. This time trend is not only
economically insigniﬁcant, but it has a t-statistic of only 0.37, so the data is
consistent with the absence of a time trend as well.
Copyright Time Series. Finally, we apply our analysis of labor demand to
a time series of U.S. copyright. Here we must assume that the distribution
M(ρ) is time invariant, and that φ is either constant or increasing over time
– as in fact it is. We measure the scale of the market by the size of the
15Note that since we are taking logs, the exact units of φ do not matter.
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FIGURE 5. _
literate population,17 and the amount of labor in the sector by the number
of copyright registrations. The relevant annual growth rates for the U.S. are
reported, by decade, in Figure 5. If elasticity of total monopoly revenue is
constant or decreasing, we expect to see per capita copyright growing more
rapidly than population. This is in fact the case prior to 1900 and for 1970-
80, but those are both anomalous periods. For the pre-1900 period one must
notice that copyright registration only begins in 1870, so the huge initial in-
crease in registrations is unlikely to reﬂect a corresponding increase in the
actual output of literary works. In particular, it is important to realize that
in 1891 it became possible for foreign authors to get U.S. copyrights for
the ﬁrst time.18 Similarly, in 1972 it became possible to copyright musi-
cal recordings other than phono records – previously such recordings were
protected under other parts of the law. In 2000, 6.8% of new copyrights
were for sound recordings, so it is not surprising that copyright registra-
tions jumped up in 1972. In 1976, the term of copyright, which since 1909
had been 28 years plus a renewal term of 28 years, was increased to the life
of the author plus 50 years. In 1988 the United States eliminated the re-
quirement of registering a copyright, so after that time, there is no reason to
think of copyright registrations as a particularly good measure of the output
of literary works.
17The literacy adjustment makes little difference; in 1870 when the copyright registra-
tion data begin, the literacy rate is already 80%, climbing to 92.3% by 1910.
18A brief history of U.S. copyright can be found at U.S. Copyright Ofﬁce [2001a]. The
1972 change is described in U.S. Copyright Ofﬁce [2001b].MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 19
What all this means is that we should focus on the period between the
major copyright acts of 1909 and 1972. Here we ﬁnd that overall the lit-
erate population grew by 92%, while the number of copyright registrations
grew by only 12%. Moreover, the literate population grew faster than the
per capita copyright registrations in every decade, although in 1920-1930
and 1960-1970 the two growth rates are very similar. This is especially
dramatic because as we noted above, there was considerable technological
change during the period, with entirely new areas such as movies, recorded
music, radio, and television opening up: by 2000 only 48% of new copy-
right registrations were for literary works, while in 1909 literary works ac-
counted for the bulk of copyright registrations. Further, while the number
of copyright registrations in the U.S.A. overestimates the share of the U.S.
per capita labor dedicated to literary work, the size of the literate population
grossly underestimates the size of the relevant market. The ﬁrst is because a
large number of foreign writers register their work in the U.S.A., the second
because the growth of per capita income and, especially, the expansion of
“American culture” around the world greatly increased the potential market
size.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR IP
WhatconsequencesdoesouranalysishavefortheoptimalIPpolicy? The
ﬁrst set of calculations indicates that IP protection for patents is probably
too high, but this conclusion is somewhat tentative. In the case of copyright,
in stead, it seems conclusive that copyright terms are far too long. The
second set of calculations strongly indicates that the scale of market effect
is quantitatively signiﬁcant and that there should be substantial reductions
in the length of IP term in response to size of market increases.
To turn this into operational policy prescriptions, the ﬁrst step is to trans-
late φ – our measure of effective IP protection – into the relevant policy
parameter - the length of patent and copyright term. This depends on the
interest rate and on depreciation.
Length of Term, Depreciation, and Effective Protection. Suppose that
the real interest rate is i, that all ideas depreciate at a common rate d and
that the length of term is T. Then – with perfect enforcement – the effective
protection is φ =1−e−(i+d)T. Reasonable estimates of the real interest rate
lie between 2% and 4%. Since the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998, copyright protection in the U.S. is life of the author plus 70
years, or 90 years for works without an author. If we take the remaining
life of an author to be roughly 35 years, this would mean 105 years ofMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 20
FIGURE 6. Effective Copyright Protection
i+d T = 20 T = 105
0.02 0.330 0.878
0.03 0.451 0.957
0.04 0.551 0.995
0.07 0.753 0.999
0.08 0.798 1.000
0.09 0.835 1.000
0.38 1.000 1.000
protection.19 CurrentpatentlengthintheU.S.forutilitypatents(inventions)
is 20 years.
Depreciation rates are more difﬁcult. In our data for books published in
September 2003, revenues accrued during the four months of 2003 were 2.4
times those during the 10 months of 2004; meaning that per month sales fell
by a factor of 6 over about one-third of a year, or an annual depreciation rate
of nearly 95%.20 Capital goods depreciation rates are generally thought to
be close to 8% per year, including housing and building, which depreciate
more slowly. Little data are available about the depreciation rate of ideas so,
insofar as ideas correspond to capital vintages, they may well depreciate at
the same rate; some very good ideas (the law of gravity) may not depreciate
at all.
Iftheﬂowofsalesisconstantovertime, foracopyrightlengthofT =105
years, and different interest rates r and depreciation rates d, the correspond-
ing values of φ = 1−e−(i+d)T are given in Figure 6.
The low values 0.02, 0.03, 0.04 for i+d correspond to no depreciation;
theintermediatevalues0.07, 0.08, 0.09correspondtoamodestdepreciation
rateof5%; wedonotreportanyvalueslargerthan0.38(thatis, depreciation
between 34% and 36%) since, even with just a 20-year term, φ = 1 at this
point. In summary, for realistic interest and depreciation rates, the current
copyright term certainly corresponds to φ = 1 in our model, while current
patent terms correspond to roughly φ = 0.9.
Calibration of Demand. To analyze the optimal level of protection, as
well as ϒ, we need to know νC and νM. A useful benchmark is the base
case of linear demand, in which case we showed that νC =2 and νM =3/2.
But, is linear demand empirically relevant?
19Akerloff et al. [2002] use an estimate of 30 additional years of life and a 7% real
interest rate.
20This is consistent with data for the other months and with the general claim that the
most signiﬁcant book sales occur within three months of publication.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 21
Take ﬁrst the case of a small cost-saving innovation – for example, a way
of making a machine work a little better. This is the type of thing most
people think of when they think of an “invention,” although only a small
fraction of patents are of this type. Demand for a small cost-saving innova-
tion is equal to the per machine cost saved up to the number of machines –
then drops to zero. Since the innovation is small it has an insigniﬁcant effect
on the number of machines. On the other hand, this is also the case in which
the innovation is usually "embodied" in some tool or machine-part, which
is costly to be produced and cannot be easily imitated; said differently: this
is the case the standard model is most incapable of capturing, and in which
the Boldrin and Levine [1999] analysis applies best. Assuming away these
concerns, we then conclude that, to a good approximation, νC = νM = 1 in
this case, since we have normalized so that the monopoly proﬁt is 1. When
this applies, the elasticity of total monopoly revenue does not really matter
as there is no deadweight loss in moving from competition to monopoly:
the social optimum is to set φ = 1, and it does not change in response to the
scale of market.
More generally, it is easy to see that if demand is concave, then νM and
νC −νM are smaller than in the linear case – the extreme case being that
of a small cost-saving innovation – while if demand is convex then νM,
and νC −νM are larger than in the linear case. Notice that larger νM and
νC −νM increase the scale of market effect, but have an ambiguous effect
on the level of IP: larger νM tending to increase and larger νC−νM tending
to decrease optimal IP.
Inunderstandinghowgoodthebenchmarklinearcaseis, itisimportantto
recognize that demand for most innovations is strongly affected by income.
Take the case of new drugs: it is probably a good approximation to think of
willingness to pay as proportional to individual income. From 2001 census
data for the U.S., assuming that each individual demands one unit of an
innovation, withwillingnesstopayproportionaltoincome, weconstructthe
demand curve shown in Figure 7. In other words, demand based on linear
Engel’s curves is, to a good approximation, linear. Artistic creations such
as books, movies, and music are similar to drugs in that demand is heavily
dependent on income. In fact drugs and artistic creations are undoubtedly
superior goods, meaning that the fraction of income spent on them increases
as income goes up.
If we start with linear demand and assume linear Engel’s curves, then
goods that are strongly superior, in the sense that the fraction of income
spent on them rises at an increasing rate, have convex demand curves. Con-
versely for goods that are strongly inferior – orphan drugs are a likely ex-
ample – demand will be concave.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 22
FIGURE 7. Demand Proportional to Income
U.S. Income Distribution 2001
Source: U.S. Census
The conclusion is that for most types of goods, the linear demand ap-
proximation is conservative – most likely overstating the level of optimal
IP protection and understating the optimal rate of decrease in response to
market size. The exception is in the case of small cost-saving innovations
that are completely disembodied and imitable – which to a certain extent
matches the idea of “process” rather than “product” patents in patent law.
Historically, “process” patents – patents on methods for doing things – have
received stronger protection than “product” patents. The theory indicates
that this is, in fact, the right approach. Unfortunately, despite the great
historical success – for example, in the development of the chemical indus-
try – of allowing only “process” patents in countries such as Germany, the
Anglo-French system of allowing products the same protection as processes
has become now widespread.
A second issue we should highlight is that we have followed Grossman
and Lai in specifying a static model of demand. In practice changing the
length of protection may introduce intertemporal substitution – for example
very short copyright periods might induce people to simply wait to buy the
book for cheaper. It is important to bear in mind that what is relevant is theMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 23
FIGURE 8. Optimal Protection and Term Length
ϒ ˆ φ i+d = 0.2 i+d = 0.4 i+d = 0.08
0.03 0.13 7 4 2
0.10 0.24 14 7 4
0.15 0.33 20 10 5
0.20 0.40 26 13 7
0.30 0.51 36 18 9
0.40 0.60 46 23 12
ﬂow of services. In the case of patented inventions – pharmaceuticals espe-
cially – there is not likely to be much intertemporal substitutability between
the ﬂow of services from an invention. With creative goods such as books,
there clearly is a great deal of intertemporal substitutability. However, there
is also evidence that for these types of goods, consumers are very impatient.
For example, the bulk of a books sales occur within a year of the time the
book comes out; people pay a substantial premium for express delivery; the
paperback comes out a year after the hardback, and so forth. The impli-
cation of this is that despite intertemporal substitutability, even very short
copyright terms may represent a very high level of effective protection.
The Static Optimum. To determine the optimal level of protection we can
solve the ﬁrst order condition from the Appendix to ﬁnd
φ =
 
1
νC +
νC−νM
νC
(1+ϒ)
ϒ
!−1
.
In Figure 8 we report (second column) the optimal values of ˆ φ corre-
sponding to elasticities ϒ in the range 0.03 to 0.40. Notice that the rele-
vant elasticities correspond to the cutoff value of ρ which, strictly speak-
ing, should be the lowest value seen in the data. In the copyright data the
elasticity falls as low as zero, but the lower values of ρ clearly correspond
to vanity press items. The lowest cutoff that is plausible for a “proﬁt max-
imizing” work is around ρ = 2000 which gives an elasticity of 0.03. In
the patent data, the cutoff values of ρ correspond to the ﬁrst row of Figure
2. The highest value there is 0.32 corresponding to Engines. So we view
the range 0.03 to 0.40 as the empirically relevant range. The third to ﬁfth
columns translate the optimal ˆ φ in lengths of term, using different interest
and depreciation rates.
Two facts stand out. First, optimal level of protection ˆ φ is less than 1
– meaning that, given that elasticity is increasing, optimal copyright and
patent protection should strictly decline with the size of the market. Second,MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 24
in the case of copyright, the optimal length is much less than the actual
length; since the actual cutoff value of ρ in the data is quite small, even an
elasticity of 0.05 may be a tremendous overestimate of the actual elasticity
on the margin. Certainly it is hard to justify as few as 7 years of copyright
based on this data; if we consider depreciation – not in the empirical range
of 95%, but say in the range of 5% – copyright protection should be at
most several years. This is generally consistent with our scale of market
calculations below under the hypothesis that 28 years at the start of the 20th
century was about right.
In the case of patents, estimated elasticities appeared somewhat larger,
with .15 being the smallest sensible estimate. With a real interest rate plus
depreciation rate of 4%, this implies an optimal patent length of 10 years,
while with a more realistic depreciation adjustment it would be closer to
5 years – again, not so terribly different than what we would get if we
assumed term length were correct at the beginning of the twentieth century
and imputed the increase in market size. If we took the high end elasticity
of .4 and a real interest rate of just 2%, the optimal term would be 46 years;
hence it is not impossible, at least in principle, to reconcile existing patent
term with available data. Realistic estimates, though, suggest that optimal
patent term should be between 5 and 10 years.
The Scale of Market Effect. To examine the scale of market effect, we
differentiate the ﬁrst order condition from the Appendix to ﬁnd
Eφ(λ) = −
1
1+(1+ϒ)/Eϒ+(1/(νC−νM))
.
To get a feeling for this, note that in the simple and empirically relevant case
that M(ρ) is linear Eϒ = 1+ϒ. Consequently Eφ(λ) is −1/2 or less neg-
ative depending on νC −νM. When demand is linear, νC −νM = 1/2, and
Eφ(λ) = −1/4. This means that a 10% increase in size of market should
reduce effective protection by 2.5%. For example, if the world economy is
growing at 4% per year, then a simple rule of thumb would be to reduce
protection by about 1% per year. In the case of 20-year patents that would
mean about two months each year. One implication of this is that during the
last century in which world GDP grew by a factor of roughly 40, optimal
protection should have declined from 20 years to about 1 year.
A paradigmatic case is that of popular music. Forty years ago, at the
time of Elvis Presley and the Beatles, new recordings selling a million units
wereconsideredexceptionalsuccessesandawarded“goldenrecords,” while
in the current times a successful record sells easily ten or twenty million
copies. The effective size of the market has, therefore, increased at leastMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 25
a factor of ten. At the same time, advances in recording and digital tech-
nologies have reduced the ﬁxed cost required to produce a new record to
about one-ﬁfth of its earlier level. This suggests that the socially optimal
length of copyright protection should have dropped by about a factor of
twelve. In the case of copyright, terms have been moving in the opposite
direction; copyright terms have grown by a factor of about four since early
in the twentieth century. This means that, at least for recorded music, they
currently are on the order of a hundred times longer than they should be. A
similar calculation can be performed for books and movies. Consider the
fact that, since the beginning of the past century, world GDP has grown by
nearly two orders of magnitude. It is reasonable to argue that the size of
the market for books and movies must have grown at least as much because
literacy has surged, and the availability of playing devices has increased
more than proportionally due to the dramatic drop in their relative prices.
Hence, if the copyright term of 28 years at the beginning of the 20th century
was socially optimal, the current term should be a little over a year, rather
than the current term of approximately 100 years. This gives a ratio of 100
between the actual copyright terms and their socially optimal value.
7. CONCLUSION
For the ﬁrst time, to the best of our knowledge, since the path-breaking
workofNordhaus[1969], wemergeestablishedtheoryofIPprotectionwith
available data on the value of innovations to quantify the socially optimal
term of IP protection, and its relation with market size. On the basis of the
available evidence, our best estimate of the length of optimal copyright term
is about two years, that of patents is about ten years and IP protection terms
should decrease at about two months per year.
Among existing models, we use the one in which IP has the potentially
highest social value. This is likely to lead to an over-estimate the optimal
length of IP protection. On the other hand, limitations in measurement may
lead our calculations to under-estimate the length of IP protection. As we
draw information from a wide variety of independent empirical sources,
both time-series and cross section, our core conclusions are quite robust:
• The elasticity of total monopoly revenue is increasing, hence the
term of IP protection should decrease over time as the market size
increases. Ourplotsofrevenueagainstprivatereturnsinlogarithmic
units show that this curve is sufﬁciently concave that the data would
have to be remarkably defective for the true underlying curves to
fail to be concave. Our plots of the growth rate of ideas per capita
against the growth rate of population show that per capita ideas doMARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 26
not grow faster than population, and certainly do not grow much
faster than population, as the opposite claim would have it.
• The current copyright term is equivalent to complete monopoly pro-
tection and is dramatically higher than the optimal one.
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APPENDIX 1: PROOFS
Proposition. 3.1. Suppose that the opportunity cost of skilled labor is con-
stant at w=1. When ˆ φ(λ)<1, in a neighborhood of ρ =1/λ ˆ φ(λ), the fol-
lowing three cases hold. (I) Dϒ(ρ) > 0 implies ˆ φ(λ) is unique and strictly
decreasing; (II) Dϒ(ρ) = 0 implies ˆ φ(λ) is unique and constant; and (III)
Dϒ(ρ) < 0 and ˆ φ(λ) unique21 implies ˆ φ(λ) is strictly increasing.
Proof. Divide welfareW by λg(λ), then differentiate it with respect to φ to
get the ﬁrst order condition for a social optimum
FOC(λ,φ) =
= −
h
(1/φ)
n
φνM +(1−φ)νC
o
−1
i
(1/λφ)DM(1/φλ)
−(νC−νM)M(1/φλ).
Divide through by M(1/φλ) > 0, the resulting expression
NOC(λ,φ) =
h
(1/φ)
n
φνM +(1−φ)νC
o
−1
i
ϒ(1/λφ)−(νC−νM)
has the same qualitative properties as FOC(λ,φ): it has the same zeros, the
same sign on the boundary, and NOCφ(λ,φ) < 0 is sufﬁcient for a zero to
be a local maximum.
21In this case we cannot guarantee that the second order condition is satisﬁed, so we
must rule out the possibility that ˆ φ(λ) has multiple values.MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 28
We next differentiate with respect to φ to ﬁnd the second order condition
for a social optimum
NOCφ =
−
h
(1/φ)
n
φνM +(1−φ)νC
o
−1
i
(1/λφ2)Dϒ(1/λφ)
−
νC
φ2ϒ(1/λφ).
The second term is unambiguously negative. The ﬁrst term has two fac-
tors of interest. We have (1/φ)
n
φνM +(1−φ)νC
o
−1 representing so-
cial surplus of the marginal idea produced; since privately it yields zero
proﬁt, it must yield positive social surplus. If the other factor Dϒ(1/λφ) >
0 then there is a unique solution to the social optimization problem; if
NOC(λ,1) ≥ 0, then that solution is ˆ φ(λ) = 1; otherwise it is the unique
solution to the ﬁrst order condition NOC(λ,φ) = 0.
In the latter case, we may use the implicit function theorem to compute
dφ
dλ
= −
NOCλ
NOCφ
∝ NOCλ =
= −
h
(1/φ)
n
φνM +(1−φ)νC
o
−1
i
(1/λ2φ)Dϒ(1/λφ),
which has the opposite sign to Dϒ(1/λφ). 
Proposition. 3.2. Considertwodifferentaggregatemonopolyrevenuefunc-
tionsM1,M2 thathavethesamevalueM1(ρ)=M2(ρ)andderivativeDM1(ρ)=
DM2(ρ) (hence, elasticity ϒ1(ρ) = ϒ2(ρ)) at ρ. If Dϒ1(ρ0) < Dϒ2(ρ0) for
ρ0 ≥ ρ, then
(1) Labor demand associated to M1 is smaller than the one associated
to M2; that is,
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM1(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0 <
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM2(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0.
(2) The elasticity of labor demand associated to M1 is greater than the
elasticity of labor demand from M2; that is, E[H1(ρ)] > E[H2(ρ)].
(3) As the elasticity of total revenue goes from increasing, to constant,
to decreasing, the elasticity of the associated labor demand func-
tions increases monotonically.
Proof. Step 1: M1(ρ0) > M2(ρ0)
Here and in what follows, ρ0 ≥ ρ holds. Then, Dϒ1(ρ)−Dϒ2(ρ) < 0 by
assumption. Moreover
Dϒ(ρ) = D[−ρDM(ρ)/M(ρ)] =MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 29
=
1
ρ
[ϒ(ρ)+ϒ2(ρ)]−ρD2M(ρ)/M(ρ)
so D2M2(ρ)−D2M1(ρ)=(M(ρ)/ρ)[Dϒ1(ρ)−Dϒ2(ρ)]<0, where M(ρ)
is the common value of M1 and M2 at ρ. Then, for ρ0 near ρ we have
M1(ρ0)−M2(ρ0) ≈ (1/2)[D2M1(ρ)−D2M2(ρ)](ρ0−ρ)2 > 0
Moreover, if M1(ρ00) − M2(ρ00) < 0 for some larger ρ00, then M1(ρ0) −
M2(ρ0) = 0 for some ρ00 > ρ0 > ρ, since both functions are continuous.
Let ˆ ρ0 be the smallest such ρ0, that is, the ﬁrst point to the right of ρ where
M1 and M2 cross. Then ϒ(ˆ ρ0) = −ρ0DM(ˆ ρ0)/M(ˆ ρ0) and the assumption
that ϒ1(ˆ ρ0) < ϒ2(ˆ ρ0) imply DM1(ˆ ρ0) > DM2(ˆ ρ0), that is, M1 crosses M2
from below, which is impossible since to the left of ˆ ρ0 we already know that
M1 > M2.
Step 2:
R ∞
ρ −[DM1(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0 <
R ∞
ρ −[DM2(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0
Recall that M(∞) = 0. Integration by parts gives
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0 = −M(ρ0)/ρ0|∞
ρ −
Z ∞
ρ
M(ρ0)/(ρ0)2dρ0 =
= M(ρ)/ρ −
Z ∞
ρ
M(ρ0)/(ρ0)2dρ0
from which
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM1(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0−
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM2(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0 =
= −
Z ∞
ρ
[M1(ρ0)−M2(ρ0)]/(ρ0)2dρ0 < 0
Step 3: E[H1(ρ)] > E[H2(ρ)]
Because
E[H(ρ)] = E[
Z ∞
ρ
−[DM(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0] =
=
−ρDM(ρ)/ρ
R ∞
ρ −[DM(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0 =
=
−DM(ρ)
R ∞
ρ −[DM(ρ0)/ρ0]dρ0.
E[H1(ρ)] and E[H2(ρ)] have the same numerator, and, because of Step
2, the ﬁrst has a smaller denominator. Hence the conclusion. MARKET SIZE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 30
APPENDIX 2: DATA
Book Revenue. We collected all the titles, ISBN numbers, and sale prices
listed by www.amazon.com for the query hardcover ﬁction books and for
the four publication periods of March and September 2003 and 2004. The
sales data are from the Ingram stock statistics, automatic telephone line at
615-213-6803. The Ingram stock statistics system gives the following sta-
tistics for each ISBN number punched in: “Total sales this year,” “Total
sales last year,” “Total current unadjusted demand,” “Total last week de-
mand.” Total revenue for each book is calculated using the total sales data
fromIngramandtheNovember2004salespricelistedonwww.amazon.com.
Ingramisalargebookdistributor, andgenerallythoughttogenerateroughly
one-sixth of all book sales. It should be noted that the sales prices on
www.amazon.com are changing over time, most often decreasing, so we
might have underestimated the revenue during the ﬁrst year for books pub-
lished during September 2003. Because of the large number of observa-
tions, we do not reproduce the data here, but it is available from
http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.
Copyright Time Series. The basic source of the copyright registration
time series is from the annual report of the copyright ofﬁce from 2000,
which can be found at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2000/appendices.pdf. Thisalsoin-
cludes the breakdown of registrations by type for 2000. Population data for
1901-1999 is from the U.S. Census
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt; dataprior
to 1901 is from http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf;
the two sources have a slight discrepancy for the 1900 population with the
formersourcereporting76,094,000andthelatter(whichweused)76,212,168.
The year 2000 data was from the 2000 Census. Literacy rates are from
http://www.arthurhu.com/index/literacy.htm. Thedataweusedcanbefound
at http://www.dklevine.com/data.htm.
Patent Time Series. R&D Expenditures by Sectors: National Patterns of
R&D Resources: 2002 Data Update, Table D, National Science Founda-
tion GDP: National Income and Production Account, Table 1.1.5, Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Population: 1953-1959: Population Estimates Pro-
gram, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, release date: April 2000
1960-2002: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of U.S., 2004-2005.